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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
Sheila Warnock Seus sued John Nuveen & Company, 
Inc., her former employer, under Title VII and the ADEA. 
Because Seus, at the commencement of her employment, 
had signed a Uniform Application for Securities Industry 
Registration that contained arbitration and compliance 
clauses, the district court granted the employer's motion to 
compel arbitration of her claims pursuant to the Federal 
Arbitration Act. The court also denied Seus's motion for 
leave to take depositions of the National Association of 
Securities Dealers ("NASD"). We will affirm. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
In 1982, Sheila Seus joined the Nuveen brokeragefirm. 
As a member firm of the NASD, Nuveen is required to 
register with the NASD all employees who deal directly with 
the public in the purchase and sale of over-the-counter 
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securities. To comply with this requirement, employees 
complete a Uniform Application for Securities Industry 
Registration, commonly referred to as a Form U-4. 
Approximately four months after she was hired, Seus was 
required to sign a Form U-4. The Form contained the 
following arbitration clause: 
 
       I agree to arbitrate any dispute, claim or controversy 
       that may arise between me and my firm . . . that is 
       required to be arbitrated under the rules, constitution, 
       or by-laws of the [NASD]. 
 
App. at 5 (Form U-4, P 5). The Form also contained a 
"compliance clause," under which Seus agreed to: 
 
       abide by, comply with, and adhere to all the provisions, 
       conditions and covenants of the . . . by-laws and rules 
       and regulations of the [NASD] as they are and may be 
       adopted, changed or amended from time to time . . . 
 
App. at 5 (Form U-4, P 2). 
 
At the time Seus executed the Form U-4, the NASD Code 
of Arbitration Procedure required arbitration of: 
 
       any dispute, claim or controversy arising out of or in 
       connection with the business of any member of the 
       [NASD], with the exception of disputes involving the 
       insurance business of any member which is also an 
       insurance company: (1) between or among members; 
       (2) between or among members and public customers, 
       or others; and (3) between or among members [and] 
       registered clearing agencies . . . . 
 
NASD Manual - Code of Arbitration Procedure S 1 (reprint 
ed. May 1982). Although the NASD Code in effect in 1982 
did not explicitly state that employment disputes were 
subject to arbitration, the Code was amended in 1993 to do 
so. The current Code expressly provides for arbitration of 
"any dispute, claim, or controversy . . . arising out of the 
employment or termination of employment of associated 
person(s) with any member." NASD Manual- Code of 
Arbitration Procedure Rule 10101 (formerly S 1) (1997). 
 
In 1996, Seus filed suit against Nuveen in the district 
court, alleging multiple claims of discrimination under Title 
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VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. 
SS 2000e et seq., and the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C.SS 621 et seq. 
Based on Seus's execution of her Form U-4, Nuveenfiled a 
motion to dismiss and compel arbitration pursuant to the 
Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 9 U.S.C. SS 3-4. Seus, in 
turn, filed a motion for leave to take the deposition of the 
NASD pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) to obtain 
information regarding the rules, procedures, and results 
obtained in other employment disputes arbitrated under 
NASD rules. 
 
The district court granted Nuveen's motion and dismissed 
Seus's complaint without prejudice, directing her to 
arbitrate her claims. The court concluded that the Form 
U-4 executed by Seus constituted a valid contractual 
agreement to arbitrate enforceable under the FAA, and that 
the arbitration agreement covered the claims asserted in 
this case. 
 
The district court also denied Seus's motion to depose the 
NASD. It noted that the Supreme Court in Gilmer 
recognized the adequacy of the New York Stock Exchange's 
arbitration procedures, which the district court found to be 
"functionally equivalent" to those of the NASD. D. Ct. Op. at 
15. The district court also concluded that the NASD Code 
of Arbitration Procedure, which details discovery 
procedures and subpoena powers, etc., provides 
information sufficient to evaluate the fairness of the 
arbitration process. 
 
In accordance with our usual practice in arbitration 
cases, we will address, in turn, whether there is a binding 
agreement to arbitrate between the parties and, if so, 
whether this dispute is within the scope of that agreement. 
See PaineWebber Inc. v. Hartmann, 921 F.2d 507, 511 (3d 
Cir. 1990). We will then determine whether the district 
court abused its discretion in denying Seus's motion for 
discovery from the NASD. See Marroquin-Manriquez v. INS, 
699 F.2d 129, 134 (3d Cir. 1983). 
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II. IS THERE A BINDING AGREEMENT TO 
ARBITRATE? 
 
A. The FAA 
 
The FAA, 9 U.S.C. S 1 et seq., was enacted in 1925. Its 
purpose was to make agreements to arbitrate enforceable to 
the same extent as other contracts. Section 2 of the Act 
provides, in relevant part: 
 
       A written provision in . . . a contract evidencing a 
       transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration 
       a controversy arising out of such contract . . . shall be 
       valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such 
       grounds as exist at law or in equity for revocation of 
       any contract. 
 
"Commerce," as defined in the Act, includes "commerce 
among the several States." 9 U.S.C. S 1. "[C]ontracts of 
employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other 
class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce" 
are excluded from the scope of the Act, however. Id. The 
Form U-4 has been held by the Supreme Court to be a 
"contract evidencing a transaction in commerce" and not to 
be "a contract of employment" within the meaning of the 
FAA. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 
25 n.2 (1991). This court and others have also held that the 
"contract of employment" exception is limited to the 
contracts of employees who, like seamen and railroad 
workers, are engaged directly in the channels of interstate 
commerce. See Great Western Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, 
110 F.3d 222, 226-27 & nn.20-21 (3d Cir. 1997) (stating 
Third Circuit rule and collecting cases from other 
jurisdictions). 
 
If a party to a binding arbitration agreement is sued in a 
federal court on a claim that the plaintiff has agreed to 
arbitrate, it is entitled under the FAA to a stay of the court 
proceeding pending arbitration, Section 3, and to an order 
compelling arbitration, Section 4. If all the claims involved 
in an action are arbitrable, a court may dismiss the action 
instead of staying it. See Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 
Inc., 975 F.2d 1161, 1164 (5th Cir. 1992); Dancu v. Coopers 
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& Lybrand, 778 F. Supp. 832, 835 (E.D. Pa. 1991), aff'd, 
972 F.2d 1330 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 
Thus, the FAA on its face authorizes the enforcement 
action taken by the district court. It follows that we must 
affirm unless we conclude that legislation passed 
subsequent to the FAA reflects a congressional intent that 
agreements like the Form U-4 contract be excluded from it 
scope, that this Form U-4 contract is unenforceable under 
the provisions of the FAA, or that this dispute is not within 
the scope of the arbitration provision of that contract. 
 
B. The ADEA, OWBPA, Title VII And 
       The Civil Rights Act of 1991: 
 
The Implied Repealer Challenge To The Validity 
Of The Agreement 
 
Seus contends that Congress, in legislation subsequent 
to the FAA, has carved out an exception to its provisions for 
predispute agreements to arbitrate claims under the ADEA 
(i.e., agreements to arbitrate ADEA claims that have not 
arisen at the time the agreement is reached). The EEOC, 
which has filed an amicus brief in support of Seus's 
position, contends that a similar exception has been 
created by Congress for predispute agreements to arbitrate 
claims under Title VII as well. We find no such implied 
repealer of the FAA's provisions requiring the enforcement 
of agreements to arbitrate. 
 
1. Gilmer and the ADEA 
 
An argument much like that of Seus and the EEOC was 
made to the Supreme Court in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson 
Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991), a case that involved an 
ADEA claim and a Form U-4 agreement between an 
employee of a brokerage firm and the New York Stock 
Exchange. Plaintiff Gilmer was required to register with 
several stock exchanges, including the New York Stock 
Exchange ("NYSE"), as a condition of his employment. To do 
so, he executed a Form U-4 application containing the 
same language regarding arbitration as the Form U-4 
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signed by Seus except that his commitment was to arbitrate 
in accordance with the rules of the NYSE. The NYSE Rules 
in place at the time Gilmer signed his Form U-4 explicitly 
provided for the arbitration of any controversy between a 
registered representative and a NYSE member " `arising out 
of the employment or termination of employment of such 
registered representative.' " Id. (quoting NYSE Rule 347). 
Following Gilmer's termination at age 62, he filed an age 
discrimination charge with the EEOC and thereafter filed 
suit against his employer. In response to the employer's 
insistence that his claim be arbitrated, Gilmer argued that 
enforcement of the Form U-4 agreement to arbitrate would 
be inconsistent with the ADEA. 
 
The Supreme Court began its analysis by making it clear 
that exceptions to the FAA's rule requiring enforcement of 
agreements to arbitrate are not to be recognized lightly. 
Because of the strong federal policy favoring arbitration, 
any exception must be founded on clear indicia of 
congressional intent: 
 
       "[H]aving made the bargain to arbitrate, the party 
       should be held to it unless Congress itself has evinced 
       an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies 
       for the statutory rights at issue." In this regard, we 
       note that the burden is on Gilmer to show that 
       Congress intended to preclude a waiver of a judicial 
       forum for ADEA claims. If such an intention exists, it 
       will be discoverable in the text of the ADEA, its 
       legislative history, or an "inherent conflict" between 
       arbitration and the ADEA's underlying purposes. 
       Throughout such an inquiry, it should be kept in mind 
       that "questions of arbitrability must be addressed with 
       a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring 
       arbitration." 
 
Id., at 26 (citations omitted). 
 
Gilmer conceded that nothing in the text or legislative 
history of the ADEA explicitly precluded enforcement of the 
FAA in his situation. Rather, he argued that "compulsory 
arbitration of ADEA claims pursuant to arbitration 
agreements would be inconsistent with the statutory 
framework and purposes of the ADEA." Id. at 27. The 
Supreme Court perceived no such inconsistency. 
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The Court held that the FAA required enforcement of 
Gilmer's agreement to arbitrate all claims arising out of his 
termination of employment, including his ADEA claim. It 
stressed that "[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a 
party does not forego the substantive rights afforded by the 
statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, 
rather than a judicial form.." Id. at 26 (quoting from 
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 
U.S. 614, 628 (1987)) (alteration in original). Rejecting 
Gilmer's argument that the arbitral process was less suited 
than litigation to the effective enforcement of the ADEA, the 
Court concluded: "[S]o long as the prospective litigant 
effectively may vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of 
action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to 
serve both its remedial and deterrent function." Id. at 28 
(quoting from Mitsubishi, supra, at 637) (alterations in 
original). 
 
The Court in Gilmer also addressed and rejected an 
argument that agreements to arbitrate ADEA claims should 
not be enforced because of the disparity in bargaining 
power between an employee and her employer. In the 
course of rejecting the argument, the Court stressed that 
courts should look solely to the provisions of the FAA in 
determining on a case-by-case basis whether an arbitration 
agreement is binding: 
 
       Mere inequality in bargaining power, however, is not a 
       sufficient reason to hold that arbitration agreements 
       are never enforceable in the employment context. . . 
       [T]he FAA's purpose was to place arbitration 
       agreements on the same footing as other contracts. 
       Thus, arbitration agreements are enforceable "save 
       upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
       revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. S 2."Of course, 
       courts should remain attuned to well-supported claims 
       that the agreement to arbitrate resulted from the sort 
       of fraud or overwhelming economic power that would 
       provide grounds for the revocation of any contract." 
       Mitsubishi, 473 U.S., at 627. There is no indication in 
       this case, however, that Gilmer, an experienced 
       businessman, was coerced or defrauded into agreeing 
       to the arbitration clause in his registration application. 
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       As with the claimed procedural inadequacies discussed 
       above, this claim of unequal bargaining power is best 
       left for resolution in specific cases. 
 
Id. at 33. 
 
Finally, the Gilmer Court rejected an argument based on 
its prior decision in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 
U.S. 36 (1974). Alexander held that an adverse decision in 
an arbitration proceeding conducted pursuant to an 
arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement 
could not bar the plaintiff employee from enforcing his 
rights under Title VII in a federal court. In Gilmer, the 
Court acknowledged that it had expressed the view in 
Alexander that "arbitration was inferior to the judicial 
process for resolving statutory claims." Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 
34 n.5. It hastened to add, however: 
 
       That "mistrust of the arbitral process," however, has 
       been undermined by our recent arbitration decisions. 
       McMahon, 482 U.S. at 231-32. "[W]e are well past the 
       time when judicial suspicion of the desirability of 
       arbitration and of the competence of arbitral tribunals 
       inhibited the development of arbitration as an 
       alternative means of dispute resolution." Mitsubishi 
       Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 
       614, 626-627 (1985). 
 
Id. 
 
Thus, the Court specifically disavowed, in the context of 
Title VII claims as well as ADEA claims, the idea that the 
arbitral process was inferior to the judicial process. It also 
stressed that because the arbitration clause in Alexander 
was contained in a collective bargaining agreement, 
Alexander had not individually agreed to it, "the tension 
between collective representation and individual statutory 
rights" was an "important concern," and the FAA, with its 
"liberal federal policy favoring arbitration," was not 
applicable. Id. at 35. 
 
2. OWBPA 
 
Gilmer was decided on May 13, 1991. Seven months 
earlier, Congress amended the ADEA by passing the Older 
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Workers Benefit Protection Act of 1990 ("OWBPA"). Gilmer 
apparently did not contend that these amendments were 
applicable to his case. Seus and the EEOC do contend that 
they are applicable here. Under the OWBPA, an individual 
"may not waive any right or claim" under the ADEA unless 
the waiver is knowing and voluntary. 29 U.S.C. S 626(f)(1). 
Moreover, a waiver cannot be considered knowing and 
voluntary if an individual waives "rights or claims that may 
arise after the date the waiver is executed." Id. at 
S 626(f)(1)(C). Seus and the EEOC assert that the language 
"any right or claim" must encompass the right to a jury 
trial in district court; thus, the OWBPA prohibits the 
enforcement of any agreement that requires an individual, 
in advance of an actual dispute, to forgo her statutory right 
to trial in a district court. They conclude that the OWBPA 
precludes enforcement of Seus's agreement to arbitrate. We 
are unpersuaded for two reasons. 
 
First, the legislative history of the OWBPA indicates that 
it does "not apply with respect to waivers that occur before 
the date of enactment of this Act [Oct. 16, 1990]." Older 
Workers Benefit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-433, 
S 202(a), 104 Stat. 978, 984 (1990) (reprinted in note to 29 
U.S.C. S 626 entitled "Effective Date of 1990 Amendment" 
(1998)). In common parlance, a waiver "occurs" when it 
becomes effective, i.e., when it is executed. For that reason, 
we conclude that the OWBPA's waiver requirements do not 
apply to waivers executed before enactment of the statute. 
Accord Rice v. Brown Bros. Harriman & Co., No. 96 Civ. 
6326(MBM), 1997 WL 129396, *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 1997). 
Because Seus executed her Form U-4 before the OWBPA 
was enacted, it cannot affect the arbitrability of her claim. 
 
Second, assuming arguendo that the OWBPA did apply to 
Seus's case, its legislative history and the background 
against which it was enacted provide persuasive evidence 
that the protection it affords is limited to the waiver of 
substantive rights under the ADEA. As the Fifth Circuit 
explained in Williams v. Cigna Financial Advisors, Inc., 
 
       [i]n enacting the OWBPA, Congress' primary concern 
       was with releases and voluntary separation agreements 
       in which employees were forced to waive their rights. 
       . . . [T]he OWBPA protects against the waiver of a right 
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       or claim, not against the waiver of a judicial forum. The 
       Supreme Court recognized this distinction in Mitsubishi 
       Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 
       614, 628 (1985), in which it held that 
 
       [b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party 
       does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the 
       statute; it only submits to their resolution in an 
       arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum. . . . We must 
       assume that if Congress intended the substantive 
       protection afforded by a given statute to include 
       protection against waiver of the right to a judicial 
       forum, that intention will be deducible from text or 
       legislative history. 
 
       We recognize that Congress, through the OWBPA, has 
       protected terminated employees who waive their 
       substantive rights under ADEA in exchange for a more 
       favorable severance package; however, we find no clear 
       indication that Congress was likewise concerned with 
       protecting employees who agree to arbitrate claims that 
       may arise during the course of their employment. 
 
56 F.3d 656, 660-61 (5th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). 
 
The Supreme Court reads OWBPA in the same way. 
While OWBPA was not urged upon it as controlling 
authority in Gilmer, the Court did comment upon OWBPA 
during the course of its analysis there in a way that is 
highly relevant here. It observed: 
 
       Gilmer also argues that compulsory arbitration is 
       improper because it deprives claimants of the judicial 
       forum provided for by the ADEA. Congress, however, 
       did not explicitly preclude arbitration or other 
       nonjudicial resolution of claims, even in its recent 
       amendments to the ADEA. "[I]f Congress intended the 
       substantive protection afforded [by the ADEA] to 
       include protection against waiver of the right to a 
       judicial forum, that intention will be deducible from 
       text or legislative history." 
 
500 U.S. at 29 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 628) 
(emphasis added). When referring to Congress's "recent 
amendments to the ADEA," the Supreme Court clearly 
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meant the OWBPA. See id. at 28 n.3. While dicta, the 
Court's comments provide persuasive evidence 
contradicting the EEOC's assertion that "[b]y its plain 
terms, the OWBPA prohibits the enforcement of any 
agreement that requires an individual, in advance of an 
actual dispute, to forgo her statutory right of action in 
district court." EEOC's Br. at 14. Clearly, the Supreme 
Court did not interpret the OWBPA's reference to "any right 
or claim" as encompassing procedural rights such as the 
right to a judicial forum. 
 
We thus conclude that the ADEA, as amended by the 
OWBPA, still reflects no Congressional intent to except from 
the FAA predispute agreements to arbitrate ADEA claims. 
 
3. Title VII 
 
Although the holding in Gilmer involved only ADEA 
claims and not Title VII claims, numerous courts have 
determined that the holding is equally applicable to Title VII 
proceedings. See, e.g., Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner 
& Smith, Inc., 39 F.3d 1482, 1487 (10th Cir. 1994); Bender 
v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698, 700 (11th Cir. 
1992); Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 956 F.2d 
932, 935 (9th Cir. 1992); Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 
Inc., 948 F.2d 305, 307 (6th Cir. 1991); Alford v. Dean 
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir. 1991). 
Moreover, as we have noted, the Supreme Court in Gilmer 
expressly disavowed its earlier expressed view that an 
arbitral forum was inferior to a judicial one for deciding 
Title VII claims. See 500 U.S. at 34 n.5. 
 
Because Title VII and the ADEA "are similar in their aims 
and substantive provisions," Mago, 956 F.2d at 935, we 
find Title VII entirely compatible with applying the FAA to 
agreements to arbitrate Title VII claims. 
 
4. Section 118 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 
 
On November 21, 1991, more than six months after 
Gilmer was decided, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 
1991. Section 118 of that Act provides that, "Where 
appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, the use of 
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alternative dispute resolution, including . . . arbitration, is 
encouraged to resolve disputes arising under [Title VII and 
the ADEA]." Pub. L. 102-166, S 118 (reprinted in notes to 
42 U.S.C. S 1981). On its face, the text ofS 118 evinces a 
clear Congressional intent to encourage arbitration of Title 
VII and ADEA claims, not to preclude such arbitration. The 
EEOC argues, nonetheless, that a Congressional intent to 
preclude predispute waivers of a judicial forum for Title VII 
claims can be discerned in the legislative history of S 118. 
 
The EEOC points to two comments by the House 
Committee on Education and Labor as well as two remarks 
of individual legislators on the floor to support its position. 
In our judgment, however, no amount of commentary from 
individual legislators or committees would justify a court in 
reaching the result the EEOC would have us reach. The 
text adopted by the full Congress declares that lawful 
"arbitration . . . is encouraged to resolve disputes arising 
from [Title VII and the ADEA.]" That declaration simply 
cannot be "interpreted" to mean that the FAA is impliedly 
repealed with respect to agreements to arbitrate Title VII 
and ADEA claims that will arise in the future.1 Other courts 
of appeals that have addressed the issue have recognized as 
much. See Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 
78 F.3d 875, 881-82 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 
117 S. Ct. 432 (1996); Matthews v. Rollins Hudig Hall Co., 
72 F.3d 50, 53 n.4 (7th Cir. 1995). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Not surprisingly there is ample legislative history to support a 
straightforward reading of the text of S 118. The Report of the House 
Committee on the Judiciary, for example, explains S 118 as follows: 
 
        This section "encourages" the voluntary use of conciliation, 
       mediation, arbitration, and other methods of resolving disputes 
       under Civil Rights laws governing employment discrimination. 
 
        We agree that voluntary mediation and arbitration are far 
       preferable to prolonged litigation for resolving employment 
       discrimination claims. . . . 
 
        We recognize that mediation and arbitration, knowingly and 
       voluntarily undertaken, are the preferred methods of settlement of 
       employment discrimination disputes. 
 
H.R. Rep. No. 40(II), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 78 (1991), reprinted in 1991 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 764. 
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Nor do we believe this straightforward declaration of the 
full Congress can be interpreted to mean that the FAA is 
impliedly repealed with respect to agreements to arbitrate 
Title VII claims which were executed by an employee as a 
condition of securing employment. Thus, we respectfully 
disagree with the decision of the Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit in Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., No. 
97-15698, 1998 WL 227469 (9th Cir. May 8, 1998). As we 
understand the opinion in that case, the court reads the 
preferatory clause, "where appropriate and to the extent 
authorized by law," in light of the legislative history, as a 
codification of a particular view of the decisional law 
regarding Title VII arbitration as it existed prior to the 
Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer. To us, it seems most 
reasonable to read this clause as a reference to the FAA. 
Moreover, we find nothing in the legislative history 
suggesting that this hortatory provision was intended to 
codify, and thus freeze, any particular view of the case law. 
Finally, even if we were to accept "authorized by law" as 
intended to codify case law, we would find the text 
incompatible with the notion that the law codified was case 
law inconsistent with a Supreme Court case decided six 
months before the passage of the Act. 
 
C. Other Challenges to the Validity of the Agreement 
 
Seus insists that anyone seeking to enforce an agreement 
to arbitrate Title VII and ADEA claims must establish that 
the other party entered the agreement "knowingly" and 
"voluntarily." She insists that Nuveen has failed to carry 
this burden. She argues as well that her agreement is 
unenforceable because it was a contract of adhesion and 
analogous to a "yellow dog contract." 
 
1. The Knowing and Voluntary Standard 
 
As we have previously noted, contracts covered by the 
FAA are "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable," save upon 
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for revocation of 
any contracts. As we have also noted, Gilmer establishes 
that a court can decline to enforce such a contract if and 
only if the party resisting arbitration can point to a 
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generally applicable principle of contract law under which 
the agreement could be revoked. 
 
By "knowing" and "voluntary," Seus means more than 
with an understanding that a binding agreement is being 
entered and without fraud or duress. Determining whether 
an agreement to arbitrate is "knowing" and"voluntary," in 
her view, requires an inquiry into such matters as the 
specificity of the language of the agreement, the plaintiff's 
education and experience, plaintiff's opportunity for 
deliberation and negotiation, and whether plaintiff was 
encouraged to consult counsel. She does not contend that 
this heightened "knowing and voluntary" standard is a 
generally applicable principle of contract law. Rather, Seus 
finds that standard in cases like Cirillo v. Arco Chemical 
Co., 862 F.2d 448 (3d Cir. 1988) where we found a 
heightened knowing and voluntary standard applicable to 
agreements releasing substantive claims under the ADEA.2 
Applying that standard here would be inconsistent with the 
FAA and Gilmer. Nothing short of a showing of fraud, 
duress, mistake or some other ground recognized by the 
law applicable to contracts generally would have excused 
the district court from enforcing Seus's agreement. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Seus relies, as well, on Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Lai, 42 F.3d 
1299 (9th Cir. 1994). The court there held that a Form U-4 agreement 
to arbitrate under the NASD rules was unenforceable. The agreement 
was not "knowingly" entered insofar as employment disputes were 
concerned, according to the court, because the arbitration clause of the 
NASD rules did not specifically refer to employment disputes. We 
respectfully disagree with the decision of the court in Lai. 
 
Finally, Seus, in support of her heightened "knowing and voluntary" 
standard, relies upon the provisions of the OWBPA and the Civil Rights 
Act of 1991 that we have already discussed. As we have explained, the 
referenced provisions of the OWBPA pertain only to the waiver or release 
of substantive ADEA rights claims, not procedural rights like the right to 
proceed in a judicial forum. With respect to the referenced legislative 
history of S 118, see fn. 1, p. 16, supra, we understand "knowingly and 
voluntarily" to invoke ordinary, well established principles of contract 
law rather than the heightened standard for which Seus contends. 
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2. Contract of Adhesion 
 
Seus suggests that the arbitration agreement in the Form 
U-4 is invalid as a contract of adhesion because of the 
disparity in bargaining power between her and her 
employer. This very argument was rejected in Gilmer, 
however. Unequal bargaining power is not alone enough to 
make an agreement to arbitrate a contract of adhesion. 
 
Moreover, even if we were to assume arguendo that the 
Form U-4 is a contract of adhesion, it would not be 
unenforceable. A contract of adhesion is invalid only where 
its terms unreasonably favor the other party. See e.g., 
Witmer v. Exxon Corp., 434 A.2d 1222, 1228 (Pa. 1981). In 
order for a contract to be invalidated as a contract of 
adhesion, the plaintiff "must allege both a lack of 
meaningful choice about whether to accept the provision in 
question, and that the disputed provisions were so one- 
sided as to be oppressive." Stebok v. American Gen. Life & 
Accident Ins. Co., 715 F. Supp. 711, 714 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd 
888 F.2d 1382 (3d Cir. 1989). The district court found, 
however, that the terms of Seus's Form U-4 were neither 
oppressive nor unconscionable. Similarly, the district court 
in Beauchamp v. Great West Life Assurance Co. concluded 
that the Form U-4 is not oppressive or unconscionable, 
explaining: 
 
       The Gilmer court has held that plaintiff is not giving up 
       substantive statutory rights through arbitration of her 
       Title VII claim. Thus, her agreement to arbitrate is not 
       substantively unconscionable. Nor is the language of 
       the U-4 form unconscionable in that it misrepresents 
       the existence or scope of the arbitration clause. The 
       U-4 form clearly states that the applicant should read 
       its provisions very carefully and that any claim 
       between plaintiff and her firm would be arbitrated if 
       required by the arbitration code of the organization 
       with which she registered. 
 
918 F. Supp. 1091, 1098 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (citation 
omitted). We agree. The terms of the Form U-4 that Seus 
signed were not oppressive, unconscionable, or 
unreasonably favorable to either the NASD or Nuveen, the 
third party beneficiary of the agreement. 
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3. "Yellow Dog" Contract 
 
Finally, Seus suggests that the arbitration agreement in 
the Form U-4 should be invalidated because it is analogous 
to the "yellow dog contracts" of the nineteenth century, in 
which employees agreed to waive their right to join a union 
in order to obtain employment. Seus asserts that the two 
types of contracts are analogous because in both instances 
employers require employees to waive their statutory rights 
in order to obtain employment. She argues that because 
Congress invalidated yellow dog contracts in the Norris- 
LaGuardia Act of 1932, 29 U.S.C. S 103, this court should 
invalidate her contract. Seus's argument fails once again 
because, unlike the employees who signed yellow dog 
contracts, Seus did not waive her substantive statutory 
rights by signing the Form U-4. 
 
In short, we conclude that the Form U-4 agreement to 
arbitrate was valid and binding under the FAA. 
 
III. DOES THE AGREEMENT COVER THIS DISPUTE?  
 
A. The 1982 NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure 
 
Seus argues that the district court improperly dismissed 
her action against Nuveen because employment disputes 
were not covered by the NASD Code of Arbitration 
Procedure in effect at the time she signed her Form U-4. As 
we have noted, section 1 of that Code provided for 
arbitration of: 
 
       any dispute . . . claim or controversy arising out of or 
       in connection with the business of any member of the 
       [NASD], with the exception of disputes involving the 
       insurance business of any member which is also an 
       insurance company: (1) between or among members; 
       (2) between or among members and public customers, 
       or others; and (3) between or among members [and] 
       registered clearing agencies . . . . 
 
Although the 1982 Code did not explicitly provide for the 
arbitration of employment disputes, we are persuaded that 
it encompassed such disputes and that Seus thus agreed to 
submit her Title VII and ADEA claims to arbitration. 
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As the district court pointed out, "[t]he majority of courts 
which have examined the pre-amendment NASD Code also 
have concluded that it covers employment disputes," while 
only the Seventh and Ninth Circuits have held otherwise. 
D. Ct. Op. at 10. The three different lines of reasoning that 
courts considering the issue have espoused were concisely 
explained by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
thus: 
 
        In Farrand v. Lutheran Brotherhood, 993 F.2d 1253 
       (7th Cir. 1993), the Seventh Circuit held that S 1's 
       three subsections ((1)-(3)) qualified the phrase"arising 
       out of or in connection with the business of any 
       member of the [NASD]," see id. at 1254; that an 
       employee suing a member-employer fell into none of 
       these subsections (most particularly that such an 
       employee was not an "other[ ]" within the meaning of 
       S 1(2)), see id. at 1254-55; and that employment- 
       related disputes were therefore not arbitrable, see id. at 
       1255. 
 
        In Kidd v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the 
       United States, 32 F.3d 516 (11th Cir. 1994), the 
       Eleventh Circuit disagreed and held that employment- 
       related disputes are arbitrable. The Eleventh Circuit 
       reasoned that S 1's three subsections applied, not back 
       to that section's initial clause, but rather only to the 
       adjoining "insurance exception" clause. See id. at 519. 
       It therefore read S 1 to "require[ ] arbitration for any 
       dispute connected to an NASD member's business, 
       except for disputes involving the insurance business of 
       an NASD member that are (1) between NASD members 
       or (2) between NASD members and public customers or 
       others." Id. The court thus found that an employee's 
       claim against a member-employer is arbitrable under 
       S 1's unqualified (as the court read it) opening clause. 
       See id. at 519 & n. 5. 
 
        The Tenth Circuit, in [Armijo v. Prudential Ins. Co. of 
       Am, 72 F.3d 793 (10th Cir. 1995)], added fuel to the 
       fire. It rejected the Eleventh Circuit's reasoning that 
       S 1's subsections applied only to the insurance 
       exception clause; it agreed with the Seventh Circuit 
       that the three subsections modified the initial clause. 
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       See Armijo, 72 F.3d at 798-99 n. 6. Contrary to 
       Farrand, however, the court found that "others" in 
       S 1(2) necessarily encompassed "associated persons" as 
       used in S 8, and therefore included an aggrieved 
       employee. See id. at 798-99. The court accordingly held 
       that employment-related disputes are arbitrable, but 
       not for the reason given by the Eleventh Circuit. See id. 
       at 798. 
 
Thomas James Assocs., Inc. v. Jameson, 102 F.3d 60, 64 
(2d Cir. 1996). In Jameson, the Second Circuit, like the 
Tenth Circuit, concluded "that S 1's subsections apply to 
that section's opening clause, and not just to the insurance 
exception clause," id., and that the term"others" as used in 
that section includes employees having employment-related 
disputes with a member firm, id. at 65. 
 
With respect to the application of S 1's subsections, we 
adopt the Second Circuit's line of reasoning on this issue. 
As the Jameson court explained: 
 
       We cannot fathom any possible reason why the NASD 
       would except insurance business disputes from 
       arbitration, but then only when those disputes involved 
       certain parties. Rather, the NASD probably meant to 
       exempt "any dispute involving the insurance business 
       of an insurance company member from compulsory 
       arbitration, not just those involving specific classes of 
       individuals." To put it in the language of a 
       grammarian, we therefore interpret the insurance 
       exception clause as something "more akin to a 
       parenthetical within the section rather than an 
       independent clause modified by the language following 
       the colon." 
 
Id. at 64-65 (citations omitted). We agree, and likewise hold 
that S 1's subsections modify that section's opening clause, 
not the insurance exception clause. 
 
With respect to the meaning of "others," the Armijo and 
Jameson courts pointed to several considerations which led 
them to conclude that the term encompasses employees 
with employment-related disputes. See Jameson, 102 F.3d 
at 65-66; Armijo, 72 F.3d at 798-800. First, to conclude 
otherwise would create a conflict between S 1 and S 8 of the 
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pre-Amendment NASD Code.3 As the Jameson court 
explained: 
 
       Unless he qualifies as an "other[ ]" under S 1(2), it is 
       plain that Jameson does not fall into any category 
       within S 1's subsections. And, on the other hand, S 8 
       clearly contemplates that Jameson, as an "associated 
       person," will arbitrate his disputes with an NASD- 
       member employer. If we were to read "others" to 
       exclude Jameson, S 1 would take what S 8 gives, 
       rendering S 8 utterly superfluous in this respect. 
       Therefore, to avoid construing one provision as 
       negating the other, "we must give Section 1 an 
       interpretation at least as broad as that clearly called 
       for in Section 8." 
 
102 F.3d at 65. Second, interpreting "others" to include 
employees with employment-related disputes gives meaning 
to the language of the Form U-4, which clearly indicates 
that the applicant agrees that at least some disputes 
between her and her firm would be arbitrable. See id. at 65; 
Armijo, 72 F.3d at 799. Third, the NASD itself indicated as 
early as 1987 that the pre-Amendment Code applied to 
employment-related disputes between employees and 
member firms. See Jameson, 102 F.3d at 65; Armijo, 72 
F.3d at 799. 
 
Based on these considerations, "we cannot say`with 
positive assurance' that `others' does not include an 
employee with an employment-related dispute against a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Section 8 of the pre-Amendment NASD Code provided: 
 
       Any dispute, claim or controversy eligible for submission under 
Part 
       I of this Code between or among members and/or associated 
       persons, and/or certain others, arising in connection with the 
       business of such member(s), or in connection with the activities of 
       such associated person(s), shall be arbitrated under this Code, at 
       the instance of: (1) a member against another member; (2) a 
       member against a person associated with a member or a person 
       associated with a member against a member; and (3) a person 
       associated with a member against a person associated with a 
       member. 
 
NASD Manual - Code of Arbitration Procedure S 1 (reprint ed. May 1982). 
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member firm." Jameson, 102 F.3d at 65. It is at least 
ambiguous whether that term encompasses employees with 
employment-related disputes. "However, to acknowledge the 
ambiguity is to resolve the issue, because all ambiguities 
must be resolved in favor of arbitrability." Armijo, 72 F.3d 
at 798. Accordingly, we find that the district court correctly 
concluded that the pre amendment NASD Code provided for 
arbitration of employment disputes. 
 
B. The Compliance Clause and the Amended NASD Code 
 
On October 1, 1993, the NASD amended its Code of 
Arbitration Procedure to provide for the arbitration of "any 
dispute, claim or controversy . . . arising out of the 
employment or termination of employment of associated 
person(s) with any member . . ." NASD Arbitration Code, 
Rule 10101 (formerly S 1). Nuveen argues that, regardless of 
whether we conclude that the pre-amendment NASD Code 
requires arbitration of Seus's employment dispute, we 
should affirm the district court's order compelling 
arbitration based on the compliance clause in her Form U-4 
and the fact that the NASD Code explicitly provided for the 
arbitration of employment disputes when she commenced 
this action. Seus, on the other hand, argues that because 
the Form U-4 compliance clause did not mention the 
arbitration clause and was contained in a different 
paragraph, the compliance clause is reasonably read only 
to require Seus to conform her behavior, as a securities 
dealer, to subsequent changes in the NASD rules. 4 
 
Seus's argument contradicts the holding of the vast 
majority of courts to consider this issue. Most courts have 
found that the Form U-4 compliance clause obligates a 
registrant to comply with the NASD Arbitration Code as it 
existed at the time she filed suit. See, e.g., Cremin v. Merrill 
Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 1460, 
1475-77 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Schuetz v. CS First Boston Corp., 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. As noted above, the Form U-4 compliance clause bound Seus to "abide 
by, comply with, and adhere to all the provisions, conditions and 
covenants of the . . . by-laws and rules and regulations as they may be 
adopted, changed or amended from time to time . . . ." App. at 5 (Form 
U-4, P 2). 
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No. 96 Civ. 5557, 1997 WL 452392, *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 
1997); Stone v. Pennsylvania Merchant Group, Ltd., 949 F. 
Supp. 316, 323-24 (E.D. Pa. 1996). We agree. Seus clearly 
bound herself to comply with amendments to the NASD's 
rules, including those governing arbitration. 
 
IV. SEUS'S MOTION TO DEPOSE THE NASD 
 
Seus claims that current NASD arbitration procedures 
are inadequate to protect her statutory and due process 
rights. As evidence of this, she points to the NASD's recent 
decision to abandon its policy of requiring agreements to 
arbitrate employment discrimination claims as a condition 
of employment with a member.5 Seus insists that the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. On December 17, 1997, after the district court decision in this case, 
the NASD submitted to the SEC the following proposed change to Rule 
10201 (Required Submission) (formerly S 8) of the Code of Arbitration 
Procedure: 
 
       (b) A claim alleging employment discrimination or sexual 
       harassment in violation of a statute is not required to be 
arbitrated. 
       Such a claim may be arbitrated only if the parties have agreed to 
       arbitrate it, either before or after the dispute arose. 
 
62 Fed. Reg. 66164, 66164 (Dec. 17, 1997). Seus views this proposed 
rule change as an explicit admission by NASD that absent employee free 
choice, neither it, nor the court, should rely on the Form U-4 to compel 
arbitration of all employment claims. Since the NASD has decided to give 
its registrants a choice between signing an agreement to arbitrate and 
reserving the right to file an employment-related claim in federal court, 
Seus argues, this court should allow Seus the same choice. 
 
The NASD's abandonment of its policy of requiring employees to sign 
agreements to arbitrate as a condition of registration is irrelevant in 
this 
case. The rule change is only a proposal. The SEC has not yet approved 
it, nor is it obligated to do so. The proposed rule change has no legal 
force at this time. Moreover, even if the SEC approves the rule change, 
the NASD has requested that it not take effect until one year after such 
approval. 62 Fed. Reg. at 66167. Presumably, then, the rule change 
would not become effective until well after the completion of Seus's 
arbitration. In any event, the proposed amendment does not reflect a 
determination that the arbitral process is not fair and effective. It 
reflects 
only a policy decision that a commitment to arbitrate employment 
discrimination claims should not be required as a condition of 
employment. The amendment expressly recognizes that voluntary 
agreements to arbitrate will continue to be enforceable whether entered 
before or after the alleged violation occurs. 
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district court should have allowed her to conduct further 
discovery on this issue before reaching its decision to 
compel arbitration. 
 
We review the district court's denial of Seus's motion for 
an abuse of discretion. We find none. 
 
Congress has decreed that arbitration is a favored means 
of dispute resolution. While this does not mean that 
arbitration pursuant to any kind of arbitral process is 
consistent with federal policy, the detailed provisions of the 
NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure are sufficient to permit 
the kind of evaluation conducted in Gilmer and, as the 
district court observed, the process required by that Code 
is the functional equivalent of the process found in Gilmer 
to be consistent with the effective enforcement of the ADEA.6 
Moreover, if there be any inadequacies or unfairness in the 
application of those rules in this specific case, judicial 
review will be available. 9 U.S.C. S 10; Cole v. Burns Int'l 
Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1486-87 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
Under these circumstances, declining to permit a 
deposition of the NASD prior to ordering submission of the 
dispute to arbitration was well within the discretion of the 
district court. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
The order of the district court dismissing Seus's claims 
without prejudice and directing arbitration will be affirmed. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. In addition to information about the process readily available from the 
Code, Seus sought to inquire into the race, sex, age and professional 
backgrounds of the arbitrators, procedures for selecting arbitrators, the 
cost of arbitration, the percentage of arbitration cases involving age and 
sex employment discrimination claims, the specific results of the 
arbitration decisions in employment discrimination cases, the location 
and scheduling of hearings, and the timeliness of decisions. 
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